

## APPLYING CLAUSEWITZ TO 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY LANDPOWER THEORY

BY

COLONEL KENNETH P. ADGIE  
United States Army

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USAWC CLASS OF 2010

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 24		2. REPORT TYPE Strategy Research Project		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Applying Clausewitz to 21st Century Landpower Theory				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)  Colonel Kenneth P. Adgie				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  Professor G. K. Cunningham Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to examine what Clausewitzian employment considerations political and military leaders should discuss when committing landpower to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. The nature of war and landpower theory are wide-ranging topics. This paper narrows the aperture to topics recent history reveals to be challenging and worthy of additional political-military dialogue during the decision making process. The six points are the nature and character of war, landpower competencies, duration of effort, density of forces, transitions, and the challenge of achieving a lasting peace. Three evaluation criteria are used. First, landpower theory must be valid for the full spectrum of conflict. Second, landpower theory must be applicable throughout the changing character of warfare. Warfare evolves. Belligerents apply the changes to warfare in a manner that maximizes their opportunity for victory. Third, landpower theory must help decision makers identify factors most likely to challenge the accomplishment of the objective. Rarely are the decisions simply selecting right or wrong, but of anticipating the distant order effects decisions have on the environment.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Nature and Character of War, Competencies, Duration, Density, Full Spectrum Operations, Transitions, Lasting Peace					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  UNLIMITED	18. NUMBER OF PAGES  32	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	b. ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	c. THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)



USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**APPLYING CLAUSEWITZ TO 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY LANDPOWER THEORY**

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Colonel Kenneth P. Adgie  
United States Army

Professor G. K. Cunningham  
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College  
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013



## **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Colonel Kenneth P. Adgie

TITLE: Applying Clausewitz to 21<sup>st</sup> Century Landpower Theory

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 24 March 2010      WORD COUNT: 6,353      PAGES: 32

KEY TERMS: Nature and Character of War, Competencies, Duration, Density, Full Spectrum Operations, Transitions, Lasting Peace

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The purpose of this paper is to examine what Clausewitzian employment considerations political and military leaders should discuss when committing landpower to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. The nature of war and landpower theory are wide-ranging topics. This paper narrows the aperture to topics recent history reveals to be challenging and worthy of additional political-military dialogue during the decision making process. The six points are the nature and character of war, landpower competencies, duration of effort, density of forces, transitions, and the challenge of achieving a lasting peace. Three evaluation criteria are used. First, landpower theory must be valid for the full spectrum of conflict. Second, landpower theory must be applicable throughout the changing character of warfare. Warfare evolves. Belligerents apply the changes to warfare in a manner that maximizes their opportunity for victory. Third, landpower theory must help decision makers identify factors most likely to challenge the accomplishment of the objective. Rarely are the decisions simply selecting right or wrong, but of anticipating the distant order effects decisions have on the environment.





## APPLYING CLAUSEWITZ TO 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY LANDPOWER THEORY

The United States' near continuous employment of military force over the last twenty years was not the expected peace dividend for winning the Cold War. Instead, operations cover the spectrum of conflict from peace keeping to general war, against uniformed combatants and irregular forces, fighting nations and nonstate actors. This era of persistent conflict will continue into the near future, with military force a likely component of the national strategy. The decision to employ military force is a political decision, and military leaders providing sound advice is a crucial task. As the United States enters the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, understanding the fundamentals of military employment that form the basis for advice to political leaders is a topic worthy of discussion. The purpose of this paper is to examine what Clausewitzian employment considerations political and military leaders should discuss when committing landpower to promptly gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people.<sup>1</sup>

Clausewitz cautioned political and military leaders that their most important task was a thorough understanding of the nature and character of the war being considered, and not mistaking it for something else.<sup>2</sup> This task's complexity requires it to be solved iteratively, with candid dialogue between political and military leaders to determine if the commitment of landpower forces is worth the political cost. Theory provides a firm foundation to guide the discussion and helping the dialogue focus on the most crucial areas. Theory serves two functions: educating leaders and helping leaders apply judgment to events. Clausewitz wrote:

Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused...and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical

inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to anybody who wants to learn about war from books; it will help light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.<sup>3</sup>

Education is the knowledge and development gained through instruction and supervised practice. Theory is a synthesis of history revealing trends and provides the educational material to train leaders. However, Clausewitz cautions that history can also be misapplied. He wrote that the study of history should not be viewed from the perspective of whether a commander's decision had been right or wrong, but why it had been a difficult decision.<sup>4</sup> He stressed that employing critical analysis to understand the information available to the commander, what was unknown and what was incorrectly presumed, and where the inherent difficulties of war hindered the commander's efforts was of far greater importance in a student's education merely than learning historical facts.<sup>5</sup>

Theory also assists leaders in applying judgment in the context of the specific case they are examining. Assessing conventional force structures and combat potential, determining economic resources available to an opponent, or gauging diplomatic support for an operation often provides quantifiable answers. A greater challenge is understanding how a nation's history and culture influences its political decisions, estimating a government's will to resist, or determining if that government will retain the support of its population during a crisis. However, theory is a tool with limitations—useful to anticipate but unable to predict future events with certainty. Theory helps leaders ask the right questions, but does not provide answers.<sup>6</sup> Context matters for each decision, and the informed judgment of political and military leaders remains essential in war.

Clausewitz's nature of war provides the intellectual foundation for developing a landpower theory model. The nature of war and landpower theory is a wide-ranging topic. This paper narrows the aperture to topics recent history reveals to be challenging and worthy of additional political-military dialogue during the decision making process. This analysis should be viewed as points of reflection that consider landpower employment over time, geographic area, and activity. The six points are the nature and character of war, landpower competencies, duration of effort, density of forces, transitions, and the challenge of achieving a lasting peace. The evaluation criteria for this paper are:

- Landpower theory must be valid for the full spectrum of operations.
- Landpower theory must be applicable throughout the changing character of warfare.
- Landpower theory must help decision makers identify factors most likely to challenge the accomplishment of the objective.<sup>7</sup>

### Landpower Theory

*The Nature of War and Warfare's Character.* Using Clausewitz's perspective as an intellectual guide to explain the nature of war, three points seem to exert a heavy influence on landpower theory. First is the relationship between policy and battlefield events and the concomitant need for political and military leaders to interact and assess the progress of the campaign. Second is how the use of force is far more complex than solely military action. Third is the idea how fog, friction, and chance maintain a significant influence over events, and distinguishes strategic planning from actual execution.

Policy guides war, but battlefield events shape policy. Clausewitz discusses the relationship between policy, war, and strategy not by defining each as individual concepts, but the dynamic interaction between the three. He describes war as a means to achieve a political end, no different in logic from sending a diplomatic note or economic sanctions.<sup>8</sup> Policy provides war its objectives and determines the amount of effort to expended in pursuit of those objectives. Bridging policy's objectives and military action is the role of strategy.<sup>9</sup> Strategy is devising plans so that actions meet objectives. In practice, this relationship is dynamic with war's specific circumstances and changing conditions on the battlefield influencing both strategy and policy.<sup>10</sup> This discourse sharpens both the political aim and military objectives.

The frequency and significance of the feedback cycle increases as unanticipated events occur. Predicting how a person might react is difficult; predicting how a society will react may be impossible. The complexity of war on social structures, influenced by culture and history, adds friction through feedback mechanisms, delayed responses, and unintended consequences giving it a nonlinear form.<sup>11</sup> Landpower, due to its required human interaction down to the individual level, creates greater friction than the employment of air or naval power. Accepting that landpower creates the most friction and chance, and that friction and chance are the drivers of the political-military feedback cycle, it is valid to assume that employment of landpower creates the need for additional political-military dialogue.

Clausewitz provides a tool to assist in understanding the tangled relationship between policy and the use of force, how the extremes of war become constrained, but also how war is a distinctly human phenomenon that seeks decision through influencing

an opponent's will.<sup>12</sup> The interplay between passion, creativity, and reason has generated volumes of opinions as theorists seek to understand Clausewitz's trinity of forces.<sup>13</sup> This understanding allows for a more nuanced and accurate framing of the problem. Clausewitz's deliberate categorization of the forces that interact in war versus social organizations (people, army and government) was deliberate, ensuring theory was not applied as dogmatic principles where the people always stoke the fires of war while the government acted as the calming force of deliberation.<sup>14</sup> Today, Al Qaeda, a nonstate actor at war with most of the Western world, pursues the rational aim of creating a caliphate without any western presence. They have combined a perverse interpretation of Islam to justify support, but control most of the people through coercion, fear, and violence. Understanding the true forces involved in a war, without the preconceived categories of actors, assists in isolating root causes of problems, refinement of objectives, and allows for a more precise application of military force.

Clausewitz introduced the ideas of fog, friction, and chance and how each is absent in planning for war, but has a deleterious effect during the execution of war. The famous slogan "fog of war" never appears in *On War*, but clearly, the intent is to describe that confusion is the norm in war.<sup>15</sup> Fog focuses attention on information: what is unknown, what is known but misunderstood, and what is known but not acted upon. Today the same challenges exist. The argument that the Internet-enabled information age will revolutionize the conduct of war is debatable. Technology cannot replace mankind in the information loop, and it is mankind with all their frailties, fear, and exhaustion caused by combat that must gather and interpret the information, regardless of the capacity of the computing system.<sup>16</sup> The concept of friction deals with activity,

borrowing from physics the notion of negative results that occur when bodies interact. Clausewitz distinguishes between internal friction, the challenges that occurs when organizations work together, and external friction by such factors as terrain or weather, both making timely and effective action more challenging. Clausewitz also believed that friction accumulated as a campaign went on.<sup>17</sup> Finally, Clausewitz discusses chance as maintaining a negative influence over war through the introduction of unanticipated events during planning.<sup>18</sup> He believed chance occurred at each level of war, affecting policy makers at the national level as frequently as affecting the tactical commander in combat, each attempting to overcome surprises. One of *On War's* most important contributions to planning is the need to accept that fog, friction, and chance exist in every operation, requiring leaders to work through these challenges through flexibility vice ignoring the possibilities of their occurrence.

Warfare's character changes with technological developments, but can also differ by the opponent's culture, form of government, and assessment of its own strengths and vulnerabilities.<sup>19</sup> Warfare has been characterized based on the amount of effort expended (limited vs. total), through comparison of one's capability to the belligerents (conventional vs. irregular), subject to moral comparisons (just war vs. holy war vs. terrorism), or predominant mode of fighting (cyber vs. guerrilla).<sup>20</sup> This intellectual categorization provides perspective and context through association of similar events. Numerous intellectual bins can be used to distinguish warfare's character, but two categories offer enough structure to stimulate discussion. The categories are political constraints and the duel between belligerents.

Political constraints placed on the commander influence warfare's character. Clausewitz wrote, "The value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and duration" to explain that not every war required the absolute effort of the state, nor did it require the complete destruction of the enemy.<sup>21</sup> Policy establishes the threshold on how much it is willing to hazard by limiting force structure, type of force allowed, or where force can be used in an effort to match ends, means, and risk. Policy drives the scale of effort to achieve the objective, but the enemy's reaction drives the level of violence and resistance. However, the challenge is not knowing how much the enemy will resist.

Warfare's character is also shaped by how opponents decide to fight each other. Clausewitz provided the powerful visual image of two wrestlers to explain war as a struggle between opponents each attempting to force the other to do his will. The decision to go to war cannot be made without estimating the enemy's objectives, his resources, and will to fight.<sup>22</sup> Because this is a reciprocal relationship, leaders must not only decide how they want to fight the war, but also attempt to understand the enemy's perspective, his ways and means, and most importantly, how the enemy might define victory. Waging war through the mirror of one's own preferred way of fighting has historically frustrated powerful armies.<sup>23</sup>

*Landpower's Required Competencies.* Clausewitz stressed that commanders must provide political leaders feedback ensuring the armed forces are not asked to perform what they cannot accomplish, or the assessment that the use of force would not compel an opponent to change their mind.<sup>24</sup> In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, factors that limited mission accomplishment generally were in the physical domain (distances to march,

size of forces, number of artillery pieces). Today, the demands of full spectrum operations require consideration of the cognitive domain and determining if the landpower force has the training and mental agility to accomplish the task. The doctrine, training, and education needs of the force vary as it moves through the spectrum of conflict, and this difference is most significant in land conflict.<sup>25</sup> This statement seems obvious, but current U.S. Army doctrine downplays the significance. *Field Manual 3-0, Operations*, describes the spectrum of conflict being linear, progressing from stable peace to general war. Additional banners listing operational themes describe the broad character of an operation being conducted. Full spectrum operations, the core of the U.S. Army operational concept, imply the same forces have the capacity to execute all these various missions. This establishes the pretext that general-purpose land forces, through organization and training, can conduct any mission they are asked to accomplish. What becomes of significant importance is assessing the preparedness of a landpower force to conduct an operation in the context of a specific case.

Military forces have limited training time and resources. This fact is not unique to the Afghanistan-Iraq era of persistent conflict and unit rotational policies, but has always existed as political and military leaders balance finite financial resources against most likely threats the military would encounter. What is unique in the current environment is how time is viewed. As unit's return from deployment, reset, and retrain for their next deployment, most units receive less than one year to prepare. This preparation focuses nearly exclusively on irregular warfare in preparation for Afghanistan and Iraq. The Defense Quadrennial Review (QDR) and public statements by the Army Chief of Staff



discussing the challenge of increasing dwell time to two years is indicative of this constraint, and how limited preparation time will be likely for the next several years.<sup>26</sup> Based on this ongoing constraint and focus on current operations, leaders should assume that land forces will not be equally proficient across the entire spectrum of conflict. This argument has generated considerable debate in military publications and blog sites as professionals debate the differences required for regular vs. irregular warfare. Gian Gentile argues convincingly, “land forces have shifted from fighting as an organizing principle” and losing the core competencies necessary for fighting a general war.<sup>27</sup> Adding another perspective to the debate is Steve Metz who argues for an organizational change in land forces and development of two types of forces, one for general war the other for stability operations.<sup>28</sup>

This debate has great merit, but as Secretary of Defense Gates has outlined in the 2010 QDR, the United States’ priority is to win the current fight.<sup>29</sup> However, difficult decisions would be required if a regional conflict requiring general war tasks suddenly developed. Two possible examples are North Korea attacking South Korea, or China increasing its rhetoric to the level where invasion of Taiwan is possible and U.S. ground forces are deployed. In both cases, ground combat by battalion- and brigade-sized forces maneuvering against a symmetrical, mechanized opponent would be probable. Unfortunately, combined arms training above company level has been reduced considerable since 2003. Political and military leaders would face a dilemma. Committing suboptimized forces to a mission increases military risk, but delayed action to allow military forces time to prepare increases the political risk of averting armed conflict.

How fast can a landpower force adapt to a new mission? Military adaptation has been a trend of the United States military for over two hundred years. Whether the adaptation is a cultural trait, enabled by industrial capacity, or the requirement to overcome flaws in inter-war operational concepts is debatable.<sup>30</sup> Adaptation can be viewed along three broad categories of education, training, and emerging technologies. A reasonable assumption is changing training methods and procedures can be measured in weeks and months, while changes to technology-enabled equipment should be measured in months to years. The most difficult area to assess is education. Education is experience driven and therefore cumulative. Reeducating individuals and leaders for regular warfare and changing organizational cultures are difficult tasks to accomplish, and the time required to complete these tasks is difficult to assess, but must be taken into consideration by leaders. Probably the most challenging adaptation occurs when a force must transition between operational themes while remaining committed. In Iraq, regular warfare ended in May 2003. U.S. forces transitioned from attackers to occupiers responsible for governance and security nearly overnight. Units that were highly competent in regular warfare were unprepared for stability operations and insurgency that followed.

*Duration of Effort.* Warfare evolves. In quickly won conflicts, the changes are barely noticeably. When a conflict's duration is measured in months and years, the changes become significant. Clausewitz wrote, "The decision can never be realized too soon to suit the winner or delayed long enough to suit the loser."<sup>31</sup> Appreciating how warfare's character changes as duration increases centers on three main points. First, wars beginning with clear political objectives and strategy see these evolve over time as

battlefield events influence policy. Second, the interaction between opponents, the population, and with other groups in the operational environment changes over time. Opponents' methods change as each side learns and seeks to maximize their advantage and protect weaknesses. Third, as general warfare transitions to stability operations forces become stationary as they establish security in defined geographic areas. This static activity influences momentum and closure of the campaign.

Battlefield events affect policy as the conflict continues. Strategy, as the bridge between policy and military activity, works as the conduit between the two translating aims into action.<sup>32</sup> Policy provides strategy its objectives, but also limitations in the form of resources or prohibited actions. However, none of this occurs in a sterile environment. Policymakers must consider both domestic and international requirements where decision-making and risk consider different factors than purely military aspects. Extended conflict creates a reservoir of these decisions, each influencing the future with intended or unintended consequence.<sup>33</sup>

During an extended conflict, the increased interaction between opponents and with the population changes the character of warfare. Over time, each opponent gains experience and devises methods to strike the other and protect themselves. Clausewitz's two wrestlers struggle against each other, each adapting to the others methods. This adaptation seems to increase as the degree of asymmetry between opponents becomes greater. Though difficult to qualify, the weaker side adapts for survival and extension of the conflict. The stronger opponent changes only when their preferred methods do not achieve the expected results. These changes occur at all three levels of war with tactical changes occurring the fastest and strategic level

changes taking the longest to develop, but having the greatest impact on the duration of the conflict.<sup>34</sup>

At the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, interaction between land forces and the population increases. Gaining the support of the host nation population, especially in irregular warfare or stability operations, has considerable influence on accomplishing objectives. As this relationship develops, the occupied nation's population develops a dependency on the land force ranging in scale from very little in the case of multinational peacekeepers in the Sinai, to the essentials of security and ad hoc government as seen in Iraq from 2003-2007, to complete dependency for all life sustaining requirements in humanitarian assistance operations such as Haiti in 2010. Throughout this interaction, land forces should anticipate changes to the relationship based on a perceived need or gain, or a growing sense of the force is no longer needed or welcomed.

Leader's estimation of the length of time it will take to defeat an opponent includes several distinct time periods. The first is the entry into the theater of operation followed by a period of offensive and defensive efforts to achieve military objectives. Once these objectives have been gained, often a transitional period between fighting, stability, and peace occur. British theorist Richard Simpkin wrote, "In the strict physical sense, when the force slows down or halts, its momentum is destroyed."<sup>35</sup> During the stability and transition to civilian control period of an operation, military activity centers on securing the population and controlling territory. These tasks reduce the opportunity for militarily decisive action.<sup>36</sup> During this period, the progress toward transitioning to peace and mission completion relies less on the occupier's effort and more on the

capacity and capability of the organization that will assume responsibility for security or governmental tasks. The pace of development by the host nation, not U.S. actions, determines how much longer the operation will take, and this reliance on people and organizations beyond the military's control often moves slowly, inconsistently, and with setbacks that delay closure.

*Density of Forces.* As policy makers and soldiers debate the ways and means necessary to accomplish a political end, one of the earliest and quite possibly more contentious conversations centers on the quantity of forces required. End strength numbers fuel the debate between supporters and opponents of an operation, complicate diplomatic negotiations associated with commitment or escalation of forces, and affect the important debate of limited resources being stretched beyond a prudent level. The fundamental question is how many troops are required to accomplish the mission. Arguably, there are three broad points to consider. The first is how political necessity and constraints affect the mission. These constraints include both domestic considerations and diplomacy to gain international support. Second, determining density requires a thorough appreciation of the duel between opponents, their desires, and understanding of how they will resist. The third and final point is the understanding that the force structure needed for general warfare might not be suitable to maintain the peace. This lesson, hard earned in Afghanistan and Iraq, remains valid for the future.

Political constraints must be clearly understood by military leaders and planners as it can influence force structure more than military concepts, and is commonly manifested in the building of a coalition to accomplish a common goal. This coalition can be solely political support, or it can also be providing resources such as money or

troops. The diverse coalition built by President Bush in the first Gulf War included Syrian forces, but their participation was extremely limited and largely symbolic.<sup>37</sup> If foreign policy constraints are not recognized then planning time is wasted. In 2008, USCENTCOM's desire to open a second Iraq front by transiting Turkey was a failure. Immense time, resources, and political capital were spent trying to convince a NATO ally to agree to a course of action that was bitterly opposed by their citizens.<sup>38</sup>

Sir General Rupert Smith, in his extraordinary book, *The Utility of Force*, addresses political constraints from a unique perspective. He views the opportunities to employ military force being reduced, as combatants increasing fight in urban areas. Media outlets or perceptive belligerents flashing images of dead or injured civilians minutes after a missile strike has served as a restraint against the world's most powerful nations. Smith believes that if the employment of force resulted in a net political loss than that force is considered unusable.<sup>39</sup> This powerful and provocative statement has significant implications for a U.S. military largely reliant on precision guided munitions and a preference for technology-heavy war.<sup>40</sup>

The second factor to consider is the duel between belligerents. The anticipated levels of resistance and violence form the basis for distinction.<sup>41</sup> Understanding how the enemy views the conflict, how he intends to fight and win, and how much he is willing to sacrifice to achieve victory significantly determines force structure and troop density. An overmatched enemy will not fight symmetrically, but will seek ways to reduce his opponent's effectiveness. Electing to withdraw and fight from an urban environment most likely extends the time and troops required for victory, and significantly increase the risk of unacceptable collateral damage and political pressures on the attacker. If the

theater of operations is large enough, the enemy could refuse battle and trade space for time. Clausewitz wrote, “The space between two armies cannot be the object of the operation,” as a reminder that seizing land without defeat of the enemy’s armed forces or gaining political concessions, merely extends an army’s troop requirement, and reduces its density of forces available at the decisive point.<sup>42</sup> The enemy could also forego regular warfare and transition to irregular warfare. Whether this translates into a guerrilla war or an insurgency, the requirement to disperse formations and control terrain and the population changes the dynamics of the conflict and probable land forces required. The combination of avoiding decisive battle and using the depth of the theater of operations has stretched coalition forces in Afghanistan and should provide strategic planners concern as they consider other potential areas of conflict. Iran, which is more than twice the size of Afghanistan, would require a force significantly larger than the one used in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Force structure planning must also look beyond warfare tasks, and consider requirements for stability operations and conflict termination. Conventional warfare suddenly ended after only several weeks in both Afghanistan and Iraq, forcing superbly trained, led, and organized forces to abruptly transition to stability tasks. General Eric Shinseki’s warning that maintaining the peace required more troops than winning the war went unheeded by policy makers with disastrous results.<sup>43</sup> Glenn Kozelka’s superb analysis of troop density in a stability operation succinctly captures the challenges leaders face:

Military leaders must articulate risk that balances force size with capacity to transition from general war tasks to stability tasks. If not resourced to conduct the latter, then the opportunity for insurgent behavior to start and

reach sustaining levels increases. The ideal situation is to deploy sufficient force to prevent resistance or an insurgency from beginning.<sup>44</sup>

Although there is no precise formula to determine troop requirements, several factors should be considered including type of governmental structure, history, cultural accelerants that exacerbate instability, core grievances held by groups or social institutions, key actors motivations and means, and the opportunity to employ host nation security forces to assist in stability operations.<sup>45</sup>

The challenge political and military leaders face in determining land force density is the assessment that future enemies will avoid regular warfare with the United States and elect to fight asymmetrically, in cities and among the people, while avoiding decisive engagement to prolong the fight. Unfortunately, demographic growth rates, especially in the most likely areas of conflict, continue to rise. Population-centric strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq have stretched the coalition's capacity to its maximum. Considering Afghanistan and Iraq's populations are both estimated at 28 million people, other possible crisis areas such as Nigeria (149 million), Democratic Republic of Congo (68 million), and Iran (66 million) could indicate a near impossible number of security forces required, and the need to develop alternative strategies to establish security.<sup>46</sup>

*Transitions.* Clausewitz writes at length the imperative of pursuing objectives with all efforts. However, he acknowledges that the suspension of action in war is the normal state of armies in war.<sup>47</sup> These pauses, due to human frailty, a change to the environment, or an assessment that an opportunity or vulnerability has occurred, would today be considered transitions. Transitions are distinct shifts in focus by the force. Although not defined in joint doctrine, transitions are usually associated with phases of



an operation “where a large portion of the force is involved in a similar or mutually supporting activity for a common purpose.”<sup>48</sup> Phasing is both a conceptual and resourcing tool, assisting commanders in visualizing the operation in a logical sequence, while simultaneously defining requirements for time, space, forces, and support.<sup>49</sup> Transitions are the actions and effort required to change the force between phases. However, associating transitions with only changes in phases limits its value, and underestimates the frequency, importance, and risk associated with transitions. This section defines transitions, discusses why they are challenging, and considers how transitions affect risk.

Transitions occur when objectives have been achieved or enemy actions have changed the security situation. Most transitions are dictated by the organization, but some transitions are driven by external requirements such as emerging policy.<sup>50</sup> Transitions help the force adapt to a changing environment, maintaining the initiative and momentum of operations. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3, *The U.S. Army Capstone Concept*, broadens the concept of transitions as it describes possible ways the landpower tasks and methods could evolve during full spectrum operations. Examples include transitioning all or portions of the force between offensive and defensive operations, transitioning between regular and irregular warfare, and employing stability type tasks to reestablish security in some areas while still employing force in others.<sup>51</sup>

Transitions are challenging. Transitions can change what the force is doing, how they are doing it, or who is their higher headquarters. The dynamic nature of war driven by decision-making disrupted by fog, friction, and chance combines with opponents seeking to maximize their asymmetric advantage makes transitions difficult to predict.<sup>52</sup>

Adapting to the operational environment, whether driven by a planned phase change or seizing an opportunity, implies changes to resources available for employment, changes to command relationships, or changes of responsibility to another organization.

Handing over responsibility is possibly the most challenging transition, especially to a civilian institution. Conrad Crane's monograph on reconstructing a post-conflict Iraq was both timely and largely unheeded. He wrote, "In the past, no part of post-conflict operations, has been more problematic for American military forces than the handover to civilian agencies."<sup>53</sup> Handing over responsibility to an entity that probably has a different organizational culture, procedures, capability to accomplish similar tasks, or capacity to continue the effort requires extensive collaborative planning and detailed command and control.

Transitions increase risk to mission accomplishment and to the force. Changes to command and control disrupt information flow, decreases situational understanding, and reduces reaction time. Late recognition of developing opportunities or vulnerabilities also hinders collaborative planning and execution of rehearsals.<sup>54</sup>

Seizing an unplanned opportunity could mean not having the ideal type or quantity of resources, but waiting for additional support could close the window of opportunity.

Execution with reduced capability to achieve a decisive effect, and reduced capacity to sustain the operations over the near and long term makes the mission more difficult.

Distance order effects, both positive and negative, become crucial in the overall concept of operations driving leaders to consider the need for reframing the problem as transitions become apparent.

*A Better Peace.* War is about peace, not about fighting, and Clausewitz considered peace the ultimate objective.<sup>55</sup> Forcing a behavioral change upon an opponent is the object of war, with a military defeat one of several possible means to an end. Strategist Colin Gray asserts the United States' strategic missteps in Afghanistan and Iraq can be traced to confusing military power and battlefield success with sound policy and statecraft.<sup>56</sup> Viewing war and peace in a political context requires an analysis of three areas. First, is a discussion of the myth of decisive victory and its impact on peace. Second, understanding what causes an opponent to end fighting and agree to a peace settlement. Third, discussing whether peace is a permanent condition or temporary state.

Decisive operations are engrained in the U.S. military's culture and doctrine. In Joint Pub 3-0 *Operations*, the term *decisive action* is used in the principles of joint operations to describe the employment of U.S. forces, while Army doctrine includes the term *decisive results* in its operational concept.<sup>57</sup> While decisive results are clearly a worthy goal, military operations in the last sixty years have often fallen well short of equating decisive operations with an acceptable political agreement. This is not an argument against the need for the military to achieve overwhelming success, but does indicate the need for leaders to frame the notion of decisive victory not through a military lens, but in the context of a political settlement. In 2002-2003, USCENTCOM and the Pentagon leadership spent the majority of their planning time on defeating the Iraqi armed forces. The military, confusing what they were good at with what was important, lost focus on the political objective of establishing a security environment in a post-Saddam era and allowing Iraq's new government to develop.<sup>58</sup> The absence of a

government structure to lead the Iraqi people, lack of essential services to meet basic needs, and disenfranchisement of the Sunni population allowed an insurgency to develop.

The second step is understanding how and why opponents choose to agree to a political settlement and peace. Clausewitz succinctly describes this decision, “when the effort exceeds the value of the political objective, the fighting has to stop,” and continues this line of thought by defining resistance as a product of means available and the strength of will.<sup>59</sup> Means to resist includes the fighting capacity of the armed forces and its people, but also comprises external support from other states or groups and ability to rally international support through diplomacy and strategic communication.<sup>60</sup> The connection of current capacity to future opportunities directly ties to strength of will. It is the weaker states comparison of its current situation and the determination that future efforts cannot change the balance in its favor.

Once a defeated nation’s power of resistance is eliminated and the decision that peace is the only alternative, several other measures must be considered to ensure the peace is viable and political objectives can be seen through.<sup>61</sup> The defeated side must acknowledge the other has won. This is not limited to simply the government signing a surrender notice, but includes the sentiment of the population. The defeated nation must also have a government to rule. This government, whether it is the previous regime continuing under new conditions or a new entity selected by the victors, must be strong enough to control its armed force and continue the systems that enable a society to function. The new government must also convince its citizens to accept the defeat. Unquestionably, this is a challenge as the cost of war and the emotions that have been

provoked are not disposed of simply at the request of a new political leader. Here the victors must contribute. The treatment of the defeated country, both through how the war was conducted and policies enacted in the post war era, must strive toward reconciliation.<sup>62</sup>

Achieving military victory in war does not equate to an end to fighting nor a peaceful resolution. Clausewitz wrote, “Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date.”<sup>63</sup> Victory is a political assessment and therefore subject to revision and reinterpretation.<sup>64</sup> The U.S. and Iraq two-decade long conflict is a useful case study for this subject. The U.S. led coalition in Desert Storm that forcibly removed Iraqi forces from Kuwait were hailed as victors in their homecoming. However, the 1990s saw Saddam Hussein repeatedly refuse to comply with international norms for behavior, and the great victory lost some of its luster in the post 9/11 world as strategists argued whether the longer-term goal for peace in the Middle East had truly been achieved.<sup>65</sup>

## Conclusion

Applying Clausewitz to contemporary landpower theory reveals his thoughts on the nature of war remains valid in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The subordination of military activity to the needs of policy has increased in importance as landpower employment across the blurred lines of the spectrum of conflict requires judicious application of force, and a deeper understanding of the tasks required to achieve a stable peace. Clausewitz’s duel between belligerents demands an understanding of the operational environment and assessing the opponent in the context of policy requirements and not a preferred way of fighting. Understanding how specific opponents will fight in a particular context

considering technology, culture, history, allies, will, and notion of victory begins to sharpen the appreciation of the war's possible character, and imperative of continuous dialogue between political leaders and military commanders. Landpower theory aids the judgment of leaders and assists in focusing their discussion. This paper's analysis offers six points of reflection:

- The nature of war is constant, but warfare's character evolves.
- Landpower's required competencies change across the spectrum of conflict.
- Warfare's character, conduct of operations, and definition of victory evolve as duration of effort increases.
- Warfare's character informs political and military leaders of the forces required.
- Transitions occur as the security situation changes.
- War's political aim is a better peace. Operations must be framed in the context of a political settlement and not military victory.

Landpower theory should be considered a tool to educate leaders in broad concepts, and in applying judgment and decision making to a specific case under consideration. In both general and specific cases, landpower theory must be applicable across the spectrum of conflict, valid through the changing character of warfare, and help identify factors that will be the most challenging. Recommendations:

*Landpower theory must be valid for the full spectrum of conflict.* Employment of landpower forces in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in tasks ranging from security force assistance, stabilizing fragile states, or defeating threats to the United States will increase. Post Cold War experience reveals the transitions along the spectrum of conflict and the

operational themes required often occurs quickly, preventing changes to force structure or retraining the committed force. Required core competencies vary, and the ability of the force must be considered when evaluating both political and military risk. Fully appreciating the tasks necessary for conflict termination and the peaceful transition to civilian authority must be considered before initiating operations.

*Landpower theory must be applicable throughout the changing character of warfare.* Warfare evolves. Belligerents apply the changes to warfare in a manner that maximizes their opportunity for victory. Each operation is unique with opponents' reciprocal relationship and assessment driving decisions on methods of resistance, level of sacrifice to achieve the objective, and definition of victory.<sup>66</sup> As the duration of an operation increases, each side learns and adapts, changing methods to increase the opportunity for accomplishing objectives. Landpower theory must accept and anticipate change, and not be dogmatically applied as principles.

*Landpower theory must help decision makers identify factors most likely to challenge the accomplishment of the objective.* Strategy requires making choices. Rarely are the decisions simply selecting right or wrong, but of anticipating the distant order effects decisions have on the environment. Candid dialogue develops a shared understanding of both political and military challenges that influence operations. Using *On War* as an intellectual guide and considering the nature and character of war, landpower competencies, duration of effort, density of forces, transitions, and the challenge of achieving a lasting peace narrows the focus of discussions.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *The Army*, Field Manual 1, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 14, 2005), 1-1.

<sup>2</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 141, 158.

<sup>4</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 158-167 and Jon T. Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 189.

<sup>5</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 170-174.

<sup>6</sup> Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?", (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March, 2006), 32.

<sup>7</sup> Jon Sumida, *Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to On War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 183.

<sup>8</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 87-89, 585, 605-607.

<sup>9</sup> Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz's On War: A Biography* (New York, NY: Grove Press, 2007), 23.

<sup>10</sup> Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992-1993): 88.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

<sup>13</sup> For a traditional analysis of the usefulness Clausewitzian trinity see Christopher Bassford and Edward J. Villacres, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity," *Parameters* 25, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 11. For a rebuttal to an article written by Phillip Meilinger who stated Clausewitz was not relevant in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century see Nikolas Gardner, "Resurrecting the Icon: The Enduring Relevance of Clausewitz's *On War*," *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 121. See also Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz's On War: A Biography*, 179 and Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 2007), 59-62.

<sup>14</sup> Christopher Brassford and Edward J. Villacres, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity," 15.

<sup>15</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 114, 140.

<sup>16</sup> Barry D. Watts, "Clausewitzian Friction and Future War", *McNair Paper* 68, (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2005), 79.

<sup>17</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 114-115, 119-122.

<sup>18</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 85-89, 98-102, 609-619.



<sup>19</sup> George Casey, “The Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century,” *Army Magazine* 59 no.10 (Washington, DC: Association of the United States Army, October 2009), 27 and Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London, England: Weiderfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 167.

<sup>20</sup> Michael Vlahos, “Fighting Identity: We are Losing Our Wars,” *Military Review* 137, no. 6 (November-December 2007): 7.

<sup>21</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 92.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*, 75-77, 245, 260.

<sup>23</sup> For example, in Vietnam, an attrition-based strategy of destroying men and material did not recognize the immense reservoir of will by which the North Vietnamese leadership empowered actions toward their objective of unifying their country. See Barry D. Watts, “Clausewitzian Friction and Future War”, 20. After Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein claimed victory over the world’s most powerful countries because he accomplished an objective of not being resoundingly defeated: he remained in power, suppressed the Kurdish north and Shia south, and maintained the military capability to again threaten Kuwait just three years later. See Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006), 10-14. Finally, as an example of diametrically opposed notion of victory, a Taliban sympathizer stated to a U.S. official in Kabul, “you might have all the watches, but we have all the time,” referring to the American-led coalition eventually losing patience and willpower in Afghanistan. See Published online by the *London Telegraph Online*, December 4, 2009, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/6724196/Afghanistan-the-clock-is-ticking-for-Obama-as-the-Taliban-bides-its-time.html> (accessed 18 January 2010).

<sup>24</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 87-88, 608.

<sup>25</sup> An examination of primary machines is illustrative. Both the Air Force and Navy are generally using the same aircraft and ships as they did at the beginning of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, though use of unmanned aerial vehicles has dramatically increased considerably. However, consider the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. In 2001, their primary fighting vehicles were HMMWVs, the M2 Bradley, and Amphibious Armor Vehicles. Today, both services use the MRAP family of vehicles near exclusively. The MRAP, a marvelous vehicle for protection cannot be maneuvered, and the significant increase in fleet density has made USMC battalions so heavy, Marine Corps leadership is concerned with exceeding its core mission of projecting power ashore. See Lt Gen George Flynn, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Headquarters United States Marine Corps, quoted by Grace V. Jean, “Cost of Current Operations Jeopardize Marine Corps Modernization Plans,” *National Defense Online*, February 2010, <http://nationaldefensemagazine.org/Archive/2010/February/Pages/CostofCurrentOperations.html>. (accessed 19 February 2010).

<sup>26</sup> Robert M. Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2010), i-vii, 49-52.

<sup>27</sup> Gian P. Gentile, “Let’s Build an Army to Win All Wars,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 52, (1<sup>st</sup> Quarter 2009): 27.

<sup>28</sup> Steven Metz and Raymond Miller, "Intervention, Stabilization and Transformation Operations: The Role of Landpower in the New Strategic Environment," *Parameters* 35, no. 1 (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Spring 2005), 48-51.

<sup>29</sup> Gates, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, v and 5.

<sup>30</sup> Brian Macalister Linn, *The Echo of Battle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007) and Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March, 2006).

<sup>31</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 238.

<sup>32</sup> Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?," 15.

<sup>33</sup> Harry R. Yarger, "Strategic Theory for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy," *The Letort Papers* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, February 2006), 13.

<sup>34</sup> A tactical example of an overmatched enemy learning how to avoid his opponent's strength is NATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force where airpower was used to coerce Serbia to withdraw its ground forces from Kosovo. Serbian ground forces, employing passive defense in the form of camouflage and concealment, survived virtually unscathed during a seventy-eight day bombing campaign. See Wesley Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Conflict* (New York, NY: Perseus Book Group, 2001), 193-267, 417-461. An operational level example is in Iraq where coalition forces and host nation security forces changed priorities of effort to counter an opponent's success. From 2003-2007, the majority of Iraq's suicide bombers were foreign fighters who easily traversed the porous borders. General Petraeus' 2007 strategy recognized this as a crucial area needing change. Heightened border control measures by Iraqi and U.S. forces countered the influx of Sunni based suicide bombers from Saudi Arabia and Syria, and subversive forces from Iran, helping to reduce the number of spectacular attacks and assisting in the reconciliation between Shia and Sunni groups. See Anthony Cordesman, "The Iraq War: Progress in the Fighting and Security" (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, February 18, 2009). Downloaded from [www.csis.org/burke/reports](http://www.csis.org/burke/reports) (accessed 14 February 2010). At the strategic level, China provided tremendous number of ground units to defeat U.N. forces north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel in the fall of 1950, and the Soviets provided weapons and advanced air defense capabilities to the North Vietnamese dramatically changing the character of the war and the duration of the conflict.

<sup>35</sup> Richard Simpkin, *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare* (London, England: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1986), 103.

<sup>36</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London, England: Weiderfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 110.

<sup>37</sup> Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *The General's War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1995), 73, 173, 191, 252-253.

<sup>38</sup> Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, 42, 67, 111-115.

- <sup>39</sup> Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 2007), 7-9.
- <sup>40</sup> Colin S. Gray, "Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?."
- <sup>41</sup> U.S Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, February 27, 2008), 2-1 to 2-5.
- <sup>42</sup> Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz's On War: A Biography*, 120.
- <sup>43</sup> Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, 101-102.
- <sup>44</sup> Glenn E. Kozelka, *Boots on the Ground: A Historical and Contemporary Analysis of Force Levels for Counterinsurgency Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, April 2009), 47.
- <sup>45</sup> Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, *Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework*, (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2009), 7-8.
- <sup>46</sup> Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book, [http:// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html) (accessed 10 February 2010).
- <sup>47</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 82-85, 216-219.
- <sup>48</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms with Change 1*, (Washington, DC: Joint Staff Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate, J7, Joint Doctrine Division, August 19, 2009), 418. The term transition is not listed in JP 1-02, but is found in many other joint publication. See *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations*, (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, with change 1 as of February 13, 2008), IV-26.
- <sup>49</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations with change 1* (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, February 13, 2008), IV-25.
- <sup>50</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander (C/JFLCC) Course Bulletin* (Carlisle, PA: Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, U.S. Army War College, January 2009), 3.
- <sup>51</sup> U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, *TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3, Army Capstone Concept, "Operational Adaptability: Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict 2016-2028,"* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 21, 2009), preface, 19.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>53</sup> Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, "Reconstructing Iraq: Challenges and Missions for Military forces in a Post Conflict Scenario," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 29, 2003), 3.

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, *Combined/Joint Forces Land Component Commander (C/JFLCC) Course Bulletin*, 3.

<sup>55</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, 189 and Clausewitz, *On War*, 159.

<sup>56</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, 189 and Michael Howard, "When are Wars Decisive," *Survival* vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 130.

<sup>57</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations*, II-1 and Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, February 2008), 3-1.

<sup>58</sup> Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* and Jeffrey Record, *Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, D.C: Potomac Books Inc, 2007), 113.

<sup>59</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 75-77, 90.

<sup>60</sup> Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive," *Survival* vol. 4, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 134.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. The three measures the author outlines are: both sides accepting the results of the war, establishment of a new government in the defeated nation that convinces it people of the defeat and takes on the process of leading them in the new international order, and the need for reconciliation to complete the peace process.

<sup>62</sup> Reconciliation as a component of post-war decision-making and leadership is critical. For several different context and viewpoints see Clausewitz, *On War*, 80; David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York, NY: Frederick A Praeger Publishers, 1964), 137; and Michael Howard, "When Are Wars Decisive," 132.

<sup>63</sup> Clausewitz, *On War*, 80.

<sup>64</sup> J. Boone Bartholomees, "Theory of Victory," *Parameters* 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 30.

<sup>65</sup> Colin S. Gray, "Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory," (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2002), 10.

<sup>66</sup> Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz's On War: A Biography*, 179.